Herding boosts too-connected-to-fail risk in stock market of China by Lu, Shan et al.
Herding boosts too-connected-to-fail risk in stock market of China
Shan Lu1, Jichang Zhao1,∗, Huiwen Wang1, Ruoen Ren1
aSchool of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing, China
Abstract
The crowd panic and its contagion play non-negligible roles at the time of the stock crash,
especially for China where inexperienced investors dominate the market. However, exist-
ing models rarely consider investors in networking stocks and accordingly miss the exact
knowledge of how panic contagion leads to abrupt crash. In this paper, by networking
stocks of sharing common mutual funds, a new methodology of investigating the market
crash is presented. It is surprisingly revealed that the herding, which origins in the mimic of
seeking for high diversity across investment strategies to lower individual risk, will produce
too-connected-to-fail stocks and reluctantly boosts the systemic risk of the entire market.
Though too-connected stocks might be relatively stable during the crisis, they are so in-
fluential that a small downward fluctuation will cascade to trigger severe drops of massive
successor stocks, implying that their falls might be unexpectedly amplified by the collective
panic and result in the market crash. Our findings suggest that the whole picture of portfolio
strategy has to be carefully supervised to reshape the stock network.
Keywords: Herding behavior, Complex network, Stock market crash, Systemic risk,
Too-connected-to-fail
1. Introduction
The stock market of China experienced a boom-and-bust in 2015. From the beginning
of 2015, good news about the stock market as China economic vehicles published on main-
stream media, attracting more than 30 million influx of new individual investors into the
market, most of which were inexperienced (Sun et al., 2017a), yet deeply believed that the
market would keep going up, inducing a trend of impulsive buying and severe overvaluation
in the bull market (Zhou et al., 2017). The turbulence started with the popping of the stock
market bubble on June 12 2015, when Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (SSEC) Index
reached over the 5000 points for the first time in past eight years. Thereafter, the SSEC
Index began its abrupt downward spiral, with a major systemic aftershock occurred in 26
June, when over 2000 stocks listed on the two exchanges hit their price limits (in China
stock market, the allowed maximum one-day drop of a stock is ten percent of its closing
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price last day). Those limits prevented a number of stocks from sharper declines, but they
also made it nearly impossible for investors to exit positions.
As the widespread down limits made the whole market badly short of liquidity, rumors
and negative news propagated extremely fast, especially via dense social networks of in-
vestors that previously formed to share information about the bull market. People began to
collectively lose faith and the confidence crushed. With little awareness of systemic risk and
lacking of the relevant theoretical backups, none administrative measures had predicted such
a great range of stocks ‘failures’. After huge amount of panic sell-off, a-third of A-shares
market value was lost within one month of the catastrophic crash. The severe systemic
fluctuation had smashed market confidence built by government that was supposed to make
financial market as intermediation to deploy excess giving back into the real economy.
The stock market crisis experienced not only in China but also over the world has raised
pressing concerns on the complex systemic risk. Nevertheless, the existing studies on stock
market crash mainly give priority to time-series analysis and study the stocks movement
separately (Choudhry, 1996; Amihud et al., 1990), failing to explain the failure contagion
prompted by stock inter-linkages. Many efforts have also been devoted to modeling the stock
market with the language of network science (Mantegna and Stanley, 1999; Mantegna, 1999;
Billio et al., 2012; Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014; Kenett et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015; Xu et al.,
2017; Wang et al., 2017; Sun et al., 2017b; Zhao et al., 2017), in which the topological
characteristics of the market and even its evolving dynamics have been investigated at
length. But still, few of them pay sufficient attention to market systemic risk under extreme
volatility.
Meanwhile, recent studies in banking systems take rather different account of systemic
risk. Instead of focusing on the individual institution intending to minimize risk and max-
imize profit, more attention was paid to the potential effects on the system-wide stabil-
ity (Schweitzer et al., 2009; Haldane and May, 2011; Beale et al., 2011; Poledna et al., 2015).
It has been found that the individual’s homogeneous strategy in reality and the hetero-
geneity interplay in network do have effects on systemic risk (May et al., 2008; May and
Arinaminpathy, 2010). However, when extending these studies into stock market analy-
sis, one essential source of systemic risk would be missed, namely the market participants’
psychological factors, especially in a less mature market like China (Zhou et al., 2017).
Moreover, from the view of human nature in market crash, Shiller’s questionnaires study
offered survey evidence that investor fashions as a factor of crisis may well predict the mar-
ket volatility (Shiller, 1987, 1988; Shiller et al., 1991). But how the investor psychology and
behavior possibly influence the vulnerability of market system is not well explored. In par-
ticular, one of the potential factors for market anomalies called ‘herding effect’ (Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990; Falkenstein, 1996; Sias, 2004), referring to the investors mimicking each
other’s strategy or following the fashion, has not been given enough attention when talking
about stock market crisis.
To fill these gaps, we take connections between investors and stocks into consideration
when developing the stock network to study the China market crash in June 2015. This
could relate market panic to market crash, and make it possible to unfold stock market sys-
temic failures from the view of contagious psychological phenomena and relevant behaviors.
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Through networking stocks with common mutual fund institutions, we find that, despite
the fact that institutions diversify their portfolios to make individual safer, heterogeneity
between stocks with different properties leads to institutional herding as they make similar
equity holding choices on the whole. This makes some stocks highly connect to other stocks
and become ‘super-spreaders’, increasing the too-connected-to-fail risk (Chan-Lau, 2010;
Leo´n et al., 2011). In circumstance of immature market, rumors regarding the topic easily
spook investors and the market panic is promptly broadcasted through those too-connected
stocks. Empirical evidence from information networks like Weibo, a Twitter’s variant in
China, has also demonstrated that messages with emotion of fear occupied more than 40%
of the stock-related tweets after the crisis began, especially for the individual inexperienced
investors (Zhou et al., 2017). In this circumstances, those highly interconnected stocks might
be strong when facing market turbulence, however, will probably lead to knock-on-effects
or even a huge turnover in the system, bringing about instabilities of market (Haldane and
May, 2011; Battiston et al., 2016; Marco et al., 2017).
Our work would be insightful for financial market policies that favor stock market with
structures more robust to economic shocks (Haldane and May, 2011). Though the herding
investment strategy could benefit individual institution, regulations should pay more atten-
tion to systemic risk. One way to achieve it is to encourage heterogeneities of investors
strategy to reshape the stock network, thus avoiding the too-connected-to-fail problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the network mod-
eling approach that quantifying the connections among stocks based on an investor-stock
bipartite graph in the first place, and then moves to data as well as data preprocessing.
In section 3, we present main results. We start with the properties of the network being
analyzed in the first subsection and find the disassortativeness of it. The following subsec-
tion reveals it is the herding behavior that leads to the disassortativeness, whereas creating
‘too-connected’ stocks. Using the stock prices data during real market crash in 2015, the
third subsection explores the performance of stocks with different out-degrees and finds
that those too-connected stocks are more stable in the crash. In addition, when the too-
connected stocks dropped a little, its successors in the network declined more than that.
The Granger Causality tests carried out in the fourth subsection show that the drops in
prices of too-connected stocks provide statistically significant information about the drops
in prices of their successors. Given the results in section 3, section 4 develops broad dis-
cussion on the findings, along with the limitations and extensions of this study. Finally, we
draw conclusions in section 5.
2. Network modeling
2.1. Motivations
Most existing models forge links between stocks mainly based on the similarity of their
time-series (Mantegna, 1999; Billio et al., 2012; Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014; Kenett et al.,
2015; Xu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). While measures of connections in other economic
network modelings that could reflect the actual interactions (Soramki et al., 2007; Hidalgo
and Hausmann, 2009; Chan-Lau, 2010; Vitali et al., 2011; Leo´n et al., 2011; Battiston et al.,
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2012; Zhang et al., 2016) have not yet been extended to the study of networking stock
market. In stock market of China, the actual interactions coupled within stocks are pretty
important. When exposing one stock to being sell-off to the decline limit (the allowed
maximum one-day drop of a stock is ten percent of its closing price last day), the investors
who hold the stock suffer from holding value decrement and being not able to draw this
part of investment out of the market. They could run scared easily by selling other stocks
in hand because of the need for liquidity, the anxiety of further loss, and even the general
loss of confidence. In addition to panic selling, many investors who faced margin calls on
their stocks were forced to sell off shares during the crash happened in 2015. These would
precipitate price falling of other stocks.
2.2. Networking method
Motivated by the above, the idea here is that stocks connect to each other through
common investors, as illustrated in Fig. 1(a). A weighted bipartite network between investors
and stocks is denoted as B = {O,P,E,H}. Here O is investor vertex set. The node of
investor m is denoted as om, where om ∈ O . P is the vertex set of stocks. The node of stock
i is denoted as pi, where pi ∈ P . E is the set of edges between O and P . Once investor m
invests in stock i, there is a link named emi established between om and pi, where emi ∈ E.
H is the set of edge weights, where weight hmi of link emi is the amount of stock i’s market
value owned by investor m. We have hmi ∈ H.
For the convenience of directly showing the relations among stocks, the bipartite graph
is compressed by projection. Denote the stocks network as V = {P, F,W}, see Fig. 1(b).
Still, P is the vertex set of stocks. F is the edges set and W is edge weights set. The
simplest way to project the bipartite network is that one stock is connected to another stock
only when they share at least one common investor. Suppose that in the bipartite graph B,
there are nij investors hold both stock i and j. Denote Cij ={common investors of stock pi
and pj}, nij > 0, and nij = nji. Then there is a directed link fij from pi to pj and another
directed link fji from pj to pi. And their weights are denotes as wij and wji, respectively,
with fij, fji ∈ F and wij, wji ∈ W . To evaluate the influence of one node have on another,
the weight wij of link fij is defined as the sum of market value of stock i owned by investors
in Cij, i.e. wij =
∑
m∈Cij hmi. Same with stock pj, i.e. wji =
∑
m∈Cij hmj. And usually we
have wij 6= wji. This mean that, when common investors of stocks i and j put more money
on stock i, the degree of the impact of drops in price of stock i on stock j is greater than
the opposite direction.
To our best knowledge, it is the first time for a stock network to be established based on
investment ownership relationship. Unlike most undirected correlation-based graphs, in our
model, the market is represented by a directed network with edges indicating not only the
direction of impact between two stocks but also how much the influence is. More importantly,
the linkages explicitly reflect the asymmetric interplay between stocks that induced by panic
selling activity of investors. Therefore, the approach offers descent support for discussion on
systemic risk from the prospective of selling panic contagion of investors. And our model can
be deployed to any of other stock markets, either globally or nationally without modification.
4
(a)
(b)
investors
stocks
stocks
Figure 1: Modeling stock network through common investors. (a) is the bipartite graph between
stocks and investors, in which the link weight hmi between investor om and stock pi is defined as the market
value of stock pi owned by investor om. Denote Cij ={common investors of stock pi and pj}. (b) is the stock
network projected from the bipartite graph, in which the weight wij of the directed link from stock pi to pj is
defined as the sum of market value of stock pi owned by all their common investors, i.e., wij =
∑
m∈Cij hmi,
similarly wji =
∑
m∈Cij hmj .
2.3. Data
2.3.1. Links between stocks and investors
We considered using mutual funds as proxy of market investors. The reason is that most
new individual investors in China are unprofessional and they are easily allured by mutual
fund institutions’ holding position and investment trending. Besides, mutual funds in China
are short term institutional investors for holding for a short period (Yuan et al., 2008) and
may sometimes behave more like the general public (Falkenstein, 1996). The mean ownership
statistic indicates that the mutual funds own an average of 5.5 percent of shares in June
2015, hence the entire sample of mutual funds represents a small yet significant portion of
total equity ownership of the A-shares market. All of the above provides rationality for us
to use mutual fund institutions to approximate stock investors.
The dataset of mutual funds’ stock holdings in China is a snapshot on June 30 2015,
around the period that the severe stock market crash happened. The dataset is provided
by the Wind Information (Wind Info), a leading integrated service provider of financial
data in China. Though the ownership data is taken at one particular time of the year,
it represents noisy yet unbiased estimate of mutual funds’ investment preferences in that
year or at least days around the reporting date, because the holdings stay the same for a
certain period (Yuan et al., 2008). The raw dataset contains the market value of shares held
by each mutual fund for listed stocks on June 30 2015 and covers 1512 mutual funds and
2709 stocks listed on either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The
mutual funds are all those disclosed their holdings in China. As for the stocks, it should be
5
claimed that the number of stocks listed in the A-share market are 2956 but some stocks
has no investment from any mutual funds, and are excluded in the raw dataset. Overall,
the dataset is of enough representative of investing pattern in the stock market of China.
Before raising a weighted bipartite graph as sketched in Fig. 1(a), we group ownership
by mutual fund management companies as we assume that mutual funds under the same
management company could have collective actions on an individual stock (Yuan et al.,
2008). Thus, instead of raising multiple links between mutual funds managed by the same
management institute and their holding stocks, we only make links between the management
institutions and stocks. The edges weight are equal to the sum of market value hold by
mutual funds under the same management institutes. After necessary data preprocessing,
there turns out to be 87 mutual fund institutions and 2709 stocks included in the following
study. What we finally have for building up the network are data revealing the market value
of stock i that hold by mutual fund institution m, which is just what we denoted as hmi in
Fig. 1(a).
2.3.2. Stock prices
The data of stock prices are downloaded from Thomson Reuters’ Tick History. Two
types of price time series data are used, including end-of-day and intraday. We use the
last price of every one minute from the intrady data in order to calculate the percentage
changes of stocks. The price of stock i at time t on day d is pi,t,d. We use the last price
of a day from the end-of-day data. It is the baseline price for computing the return next
day, denoted as pi,d. The percentage change of stock i at time t on day d is computed by
(pi,t,d − pi,d−1)/pi,d−1. The reason is that this kind of percentage changes is consistent with
what investors see during trading hours on any trading information board, which could stir
up tensions and impact the prices of stocks through trading behavior directly.
As we focus on studying the market crash, only four days when big shocks happened are
included in sample for the main results. These are June 26, June 29, July 2 and July 3.
These four days all witnessed the abrupt decline of a great range of stocks, see Table 1.
Table 1: Numbers of stocks that reached their down limit.
date
number of stocks that reached
their lower limit
Market index percentage
change(SSEC)
06/26/2015 2027 -7.4%
06/29/2015 1514 -3.3%
07/02/2015 1462 -3.5%
07/03/2015 1429 -5.8%
It is worth noting that other than the market crash period, we also consider a comparison
case when there was a bull market to make further discussions on our findings. Those analysis
could be found in appendix, whereas the data used are from the same source and under the
same preprocessing procedure as stated above. The datasets analyzed in the current study
are available in the figshare.com repository, see https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5217232.v1.
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3. Results
3.1. Too-connected stocks in the network
The established network of the stock market possesses 2709 nodes and 313307 edges
after necessary filtering (see Appendix Fig. A4 for details). It is directed, asymmetrical,
with no self-connections. The basic statistical information of the network could be found in
Table 2 in rows of Jun-2015. This network is highly non-random and disassortative (also see
Appendix Figs. A1, A2), especially in terms of out-degrees, much differs from the previous
studies (Kenett et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017).
Note that the Jun-2015 network is the one used in the analysis of main text. The
Dec-2014 network is a comparison case, built by the stock holding data released in mutual
funds’ annual reports in December 31 2014, when there was a bull market. The similarity of
indicators in Table 2 shows that the established network structure is persistent, independent
to the performance of the market to some extent, whether there is a jump or plunge.
Table 2: Statistical information of the networks.
year density number of nodes number of edges
Dec-2014 0.04 2418 232905
Jun-2015 0.043 2709 313307
year in-degree assortativity out-degree assortativity average degree
Dec-2014 -0.256 -0.493 96.321
Jun-2015 -0.177 -0.421 115.654
year mean of edge weights standard deviation of edge weights sum of edge weights
Dec-2014 307807.1 369487.4 7.17E+10
Jun-2015 299764.5 246610.8 9.39E+10
year
number of strongly
connected components
number of weakly
connected components
size of largest strongly
connected components
size of largest weakly
connected components
Dec-2014 2115 173 304 2246
Jun-2015 2320 203 390 2507
Fig. 2 shows a subgraph of the network. The subgraph contains all the edges starting from
the node ‘601318.SH’, which is the node with the most out-degrees. The graphs illustrate
how the too-connected stocks take control over the whole system, raising the concern that
nodes possessing many successors and their edges weight can not be ignored, tend to have
great influence on other nodes with respect to both out-degrees and out-strengths in the
networked market (see also Appendix Table A1). Contrary to the obvious dominance in
connectivity, the most connected group of stocks occupies only 18% market value of the
total 2709 securities.
Departing from the notion of ‘too-big-to-fail’ in economic system, the small fraction of
market value but large out-degree in the network implies that it is not ‘big’ in scale but ‘big’
in connectivity that induces the potential issue of ‘too-big-to-fail’ or to be more exact, ‘too-
connected-to-fail’. Hereafter the ‘too-connected’ stocks refer to those of high out-degrees.
These stocks mainly belong to financial sector, and most of them are large-cap stocks (see
Appendix Table A2 and A3).
Consistent with concerns in the banking system (Haldane and May, 2011), relatively
small initial liquidity shocks from any of these influential nodes would make a huge con-
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002387.SZ
601016.SH
300130.SZ
600116.SH
600586.SH
600565.SH
300381.SZ
600805.SH
600050.SH
000688.SZ
600892.SH
002431.SZ
601939.SH
000513.SZ
000711.SZ
002024.SZ
002530.SZ
000900.SZ
000882.SZ
000960.SZ
000838.SZ
603799.SH
002136.SZ
600030.SH
600298.SH
002640.SZ
600401.SH
002262.SZ
300113.SZ
000933.SZ
300230.SZ
002363.SZ
002721.SZ
000669.SZ
600302.SH
300250.SZ
000100.SZ
002334.SZ
600677.SH
600757.SH
300271.SZ
600170.SH
002745.SZ
002173.SZ
000403.SZ
000687.SZ
603306.SH
000018.SZ
600060.SH
601628.SH
300324.SZ
000541.SZ
600354.SH
300322.SZ
300021.SZ
002187.SZ
300178.SZ
600976.SH
002077.SZ
300242.SZ
000998.SZ
600642.SH
601000.SH
600778.SH
000050.SZ
600104.SH
002440.SZ
600603.SH
600348.SH
600993.SH
002215.SZ
601789.SH
000979.SZ
600251.SH
601188.SH
600530.SH
000726.SZ
300383.SZ
300360.SZ
300379.SZ
601519.SH
600811.SH
002765.SZ
300445.SZ
002629.SZ
600125.SH
300083.SZ
300248.SZ
300108.SZ
002095.SZ
600960.SH
000601.SZ
000877.SZ
000048.SZ
000987.SZ
300340.SZ
600717.SH
000631.SZ
002322.SZ
002676.SZ
600526.SH
603300.SH
002205.SZ
603022.SH
600000. H
600863.SH
002712.SZ
600151.SH
000009.SZ
002320.SZ
002251.SZ
002176.SZ
600216.SH
002182.SZ
000021.SZ
000558.SZ
002048.SZ
300134.SZ
300180.SZ
002229.SZ
300226.SZ
000918.SZ
002010.SZ
002282.SZ
002129.SZ
002246.SZ
300461.SZ
002483.SZ
600483.SH
000553.SZ
600093.SH
002365.SZ
600332.SH
002432.SZ
300235.SZ
300053.SZ
300298.SZ
600208.SH
300365.SZ
000498.SZ
002383.SZ
002243.SZ
600713.SH
603901.SH
600548.SH
300186.SZ
601969.SH
002028.SZ
300398.SZ
600858.SH
603000.SH
601339.SH
600500.SH
600469.SH
002259.SZ
603012.SH
300037.SZ
600233.SH
002560.SZ
002224.SZ
000952.SZ
000948.SZ
000886.SZ
002630.SZ
000748.SZ
000802.SZ
601288.SH
601106.SH
600791.SH
600366.SH
600197.SH
603019.SH
600260.SH
600705.SH
000917.SZ
002071.SZ
601166.SH
000544.SZ
600678.SH
002378.SZ
300059.SZ
300210.SZ
002511.SZ
300481.SZ
300018.SZ
600358.SH
002014.SZ
600875.SH
300194.SZ
300161.SZ
000798.SZ
600176.SH
000750.SZ
002612.SZ
002232.SZ
002753.SZ
600673.SH
000407.SZ
600405.SH
600435.SH
300413.SZ
000939.SZ
600129.SH
600320.SH
000722.SZ
300478.SZ
300327.SZ
000718.SZ
600308.SH
000025.SZ
601258.SH
000650.SZ
300068.SZ
300075.SZ
000561.SZ
600399.SH
600655.SH
601390.SH
601888.SH
300049.SZ
600132.SH
000973.SZ
000908.SZ
300449.SZ
002526.SZ
002411.SZ
603566.SH
002401.SZ
002488.SZ
600896.SH
002763.SZ
300087.SZ
002108.SZ
300016.SZ
600986.SH 002587.SZ
000042.SZ
601798.SH
002444.SZ
002479.SZ
600027.SH
000066.SZ
600446.SH
300233.SZ
000592.SZ
002287.SZ
002083.SZ
002493.SZ
002461.SZ
600884.SH
300165.SZ
000635.SZ
600096.SH
601678.SH
002041.SZ
000785.SZ
600716.SH
000889.SZ
601238.SH
002634.SZ
601113.SH
000826.SZ
000099.SZ
002238.SZ
300460.SZ
600183.SH
000700.SZ
600257.SH
002768.SZ
300104.SZ
000418.SZ
600028.SH
002157.SZ
603789.SH
000070.SZ
600761.SH
300008.SZ
002222.SZ
600720.SH
000539.SZ
002179.SZ
002391.SZ
002318.SZ
002293.SZ
000090.SZ
002269.SZ
300264.SZ
300283.SZ
300356.SZ
600663.SH
000039.SZ
300154.SZ
002168.SZ
002706.SZ
600600.SH
300005.SZ
002398.SZ
600781.SH
300189.SZ
300399.SZ
300013.SZ
603333.SH
600824.SH
002190.SZ
000567.SZ
000630.SZ
600617.SH
002680.SZ
300403.SZ
600475.SH
000951.SZ
000055.SZ
002256.SZ
300204.SZ
603555.SH
603616.SH
000863.SZ
002005.SZ
600292.SH
603223.SH
600992.SH
300294.SZ
002644.SZ
002405.SZ
300088.SZ
000825.SZ
601600.SH
600612.SH
600982.SH
300302.SZ
002151.SZ
601996.SH
600313.SH
300459.SZ
002759.SZ
300071.SZ
000673.SZ
002115.SZ
600067.SH
300033.SZ
002576.SZ
002564.SZ
002381.SZ
002090.SZ
600316.SH
600243.SH
000536.SZ
300286.SZ
002737.SZ
000417.SZ
300255.SZ
002429.SZ
002165.SZ
600113.SH
300477.SZ
300384.SZ
600376.SH
002303.SZ
600547.SH
002775.SZ
000921.SZ
600621.SH
600120.SH
002522.SZ
000976.SZ
600033.SH
300389.SZ
600289.SH
002546.SZ
600220.SH
002045.SZ
002600.SZ
001696.SZ
300238.SZ
002242.SZ
000721.SZ
300392.SZ
300131.SZ
000151.SZ
002074.SZ
300137.SZ
002605.SZ
002252.SZ
603328.SH
000968.SZ
600855.SH
300469.SZ
600699.SH
300339.SZ
002313.SZ
600549.SH
601677.SH
600550.SH
002111.SZ
600409.SH
600270.SH
600917.SH
000893.SZ
000158.SZ
000839.SZ
600141.SH
600284.SH
002414.SZ
600736.SH
000524.SZ
300307.SZ
600570.SH
002221.SZ
603128.SH
600338.SH
600085.SH
002069.SZ
000096.SZ
002686.SZ
600756.SH
300054.SZ
300336.SZ
600686.SH
600750.SH
603686.SH
600808.SH
002664.SZ
002035.SZ
601158.SH
000532.SZ
600119.SH
002335.SZ
002203.SZ
300115.SZ
002590.SZ
002561.SZ
300191.SZ
000157.SZ
300036.SZ
002618.SZ
002063.SZ
000529.SZ
300462.SZ
002341.SZ
300314.SZ
600048.SH
000988.SZ
000166.SZ
300359.SZ
300003.SZ
300143.SZ
000597.SZ
300028.SZ
002650.SZ
000712.SZ
600007.SH
300196.SZ
300121.SZ
601038.SH
002675.SZ
601633.SH
002582.SZ
300042.SZ
600019.SH
000612.SZ
002126.SZ
000868.SZ
600844.SH
002771.SZ
300166.SZ
002457.SZ
600618.SH
002181.SZ
002516.SZ
000906.SZ
603311.SH
600056.SH
000568.SZ
600198.SH
600355.SH
002055.SZ
300027.SZ
601857.SH
002244.SZ
002001.SZ
002648.SZ
300216.SZ
600168.SH
000603.SZ
300175.SZ
600647.SH
002305.SZ
002747.SZ
002588.SZ
002504.SZ
600771.SH
600449.SH
000789.SZ
600628.SH
000928.SZ
300170.SZ
600398.SH
600086.SH
002496.SZ
600746.SH
300427.SZ
600172.SH
002407.SZ
601688.SH
002423.SZ
000550.SZ
002470.SZ
300245.SZ
002551.SZ
000400.SZ
300402.SZ
002358.SZ
601958.SH
000681.SZ
300348.SZ
002595.SZ
600517.SH
002011.SZ
300224.SZ
600803.SH
002353.SZ
300101.SZ
002529.SZ
002466.SZ
600979.SH
000806.SZ
002273.SZ
601231.SH
002298.SZ
300237.SZ
002554.SZ
002485.SZ
002767.SZ
600859.SH
601988.SH
300155.SZ
300466.SZ
000993.SZ
300269.SZ
600497.SH
603898.SH
300183.SZ
600518.SH
600967.SH
300279.SZ
002148.SZ
002570.SZ
300332.SZ
000155.SZ
002134.SZ
000967.SZ
600269.SH
000022.SZ
600784.SH
300370.SZ
002231.SZ
600282.SH
600739.SH
300201.SZ
601908.SH
002195.SZ
300436.SZ
002344.SZ
000793.SZ
600059.SH
002046.SZ
600110.SH
600360.SH
002474.SZ
000911.SZ
000063.SZ
002532.SZ
000797.SZ
600807.SH
600650.SH
002734.SZ
002510.SZ
002020.SZ
002611.SZ
601601.SH
601618.SH
300085.SZ
300263.SZ
300291.SZ
600797.SH
002198.SZ
300369.SZ
002402.SZ
600850.SH
600266.SH
300017.SZ
300197.SZ
600789.SH
002436.SZ
000982.SZ
600706.SH
002207.SZ
600418.SH
300412.SZ
300050.SZ
002122.SZ
002118.SZ
002050.SZ
300153.SZ
300213.SZ
300074.SZ
300149.SZ
600702.SH
603698.SH
300072.SZ
600704.SH
300456.SZ
300111.SZ
002726.SZ
000678.SZ
002277.SZ
002357.SZ
601225.SH
600985.SH
601069.SH
603066.SH
600112.SH
300472.SZ
002249.SZ
600566.SH
600403.SH
600219.SH
600775.SH
002458.SZ
600596.SH
000962.SZ
600415.SH
002519.SZ
000333.SZ
600300.SH
002306.SZ
002642.SZ
600162.SH
002505.SZ
000423.SZ
000661.SZ
002666.SZ
002017.SZ
300313.SZ
603606.SH
002392.SZ
002075.SZ
300207.SZ
601607.SH
002285.SZ
002683.SZ
002185.SZ
000006.SZ
601198.SH
601002.SH
000888.SZ
600498.SH
300010.SZ
002278.SZ
300094.SZ
600729.SH
002699.SZ
600584.SH
600158.SH
600393.SH
002309.SZ
002100.SZ
600973.SH
300241.SZ
600021.SH
002218.SZ
600351.SH
300424.SZ
600080.SH
002756.SZ
300326.SZ
000902.SZ
600322.SH
600189.SH
002339.SZ
601965.SH
600114.SH
002469.SZ
000717.SZ
000783.SZ
002384.SZ
002579.SZ
603020.SH
600522.SH
300041.SZ
600867.SH
300265.SZ
601866.SH
002059.SZ
002639.SZ
002255.SZ
600963.SH
600153.SH
002130.SZ
600742.SH
002705.SZ
600012.SH
300342.SZ
000881.SZ
603158.SH
002367.SZ
300030.SZ
601099.SH
000028.SZ
002462.SZ
002655.SZ
300414.SZ
300198.SZ
002174.SZ
600834.SH
601718.SH
600295.SH
002261.SZ
000862.SZ
300432.SZ
000069.SZ
002018.SZ
600879.SH
600983.SH
600509.SH
600240.SH
000665.SZ
601808.SH
600481.SH
300089.SZ
600635.SH
601991.SH
000546.SZ
300439.SZ
000800.SZ
002121.SZ
000523.SZ
600231.SH
600456.SH
300181.SZ
300234.SZ
002144.SZ
300362.SZ
002073.SZ
002751.SZ
002114.SZ
600537.SH
000421.SZ
300022.SZ
002585.SZ
300046.SZ
000620.SZ
002647.SZ
000823.SZ
000925.SZ
000045.SZ
002217.SZ
600252.SH
600372.SH
002562.SZ
600123.SH
600273.SH
002049.SZ
601101.SH
600210.SH
000652.SZ
600580.SH
002426.SZ
600592.SH
600872.SH
300163.SZ
300052.SZ
000732.SZ
002237.SZ
300080.SZ
000589.SZ
600599.SH
600438.SH
300285.SZ
600569.SH
000752.SZ
000850.SZ
600452.SH
603188.SH
000999.SZ
000027.SZ
002023.SZ
600157.SH
002653.SZ
600978.SH
300078.SZ
600755.SH
002477.SZ
002253.SZ
600674.SH
002714.SZ
002142.SZ
000639.SZ
600880.SH
600128.SH
002758.SZ
600335.SH
300092.SZ
000555.SZ
000970.SZ
600894.SH
002324.SZ
000615.SZ
002281.SZ
600109.SH
300317.SZ
002558.SZ
002446.SZ
600090.SH
002696.SZ
600330.SH
601368.SH
300337.SZ
300331.SZ
300014.SZ
002443.SZ
002419.SZ
002332.SZ
300185.SZ
002146.SZ
600651.SH
600648.SH
002032.SZ
300138.SZ
300208.SZ
300158.SZ
601126.SH
002227.SZ
600578.SH
002329.SZ
600510.SH
603030.SH
600812.SH
000016.SZ
300258.SZ
600055.SH
600038.SH
603589.SH
002761.SZ
002520.SZ
601179.SH
002397.SZ
000516.SZ
002741.SZ
002112.SZ
000830.SZ
601898.SH
600780.SH
603828.SH
601118.SH
300442.SZ
000035.SZ
002170.SZ
002012.SZ
000008.SZ
000985.SZ
000959.SZ
601877.SH
300487.SZ
601766.SH
600876.SH
603118.SH
603077.SH
600818.SH
002452.SZ
600823.SH
002368.SZ
600667.SH
601818.SH
300266.SZ
600682.SH
002315.SZ
002297.SZ
600016.S
600004.SH
600209.SH
000759.SZ
600167.SH
002003.SZ
002742.SZ
600830.SH
603456.SH
000078.SZ
600639.SH
600770.SH
000737.SZ
300350.SZ
002169.SZ
002682.SZ
600776.SH
600826.SH
002030.SZ
000623.SZ
600657.SH
601666.SH
002189.SZ
300193.SZ
000828.SZ
601007.SH
600495.SH
002486.SZ
600185.SH
002350.SZ
000590.SZ
600278.SH
002200.SZ
002009.SZ
600690.SH
600559.SH
002081.SZ
000656.SZ
600802.SH
002539.SZ
300394.SZ
300373.SZ
300029.SZ
300129.SZ
300450.SZ
002581.SZ
300430.SZ
000778.SZ
002509.SZ
300107.SZ
600246.SH
000716.SZ
002490.SZ
600390.SH
002574.SZ
000878.SZ
000638.SZ
000811.SZ
600171.SH
600461.SH
600582.SH
300386.SZ
600256.SH
600363.SH
600184.SH
603169.SH
603268.SH
600277.SH
002092.SZ
600846.SH
601515.SH
603199.SH
000786.SZ
000923.SZ
603309.SH
600089.SH
600998.SH
300281.SZ
603806.SH
300318.SZ
002622.SZ
000625.SZ
600764.SH
600161.SH
600523.SH
600782.SH
600031.SH
002663.SZ
600606.SH
600400.SH
000809.SZ
600315.SH
600378.SH
000961.SZ
603838.SH
300077.SZ
600238.SH
600745.SH
600202.SH
300223.SZ
300483.SZ
600226.SH
300044.SZ
300368.SZ
300376.SZ
002607.SZ
002250.SZ
603355.SH
600882.SH
603609.SH
600516.SH
601333.SH
300127.SZ
600139.SH
002695.SZ
603005.SH
002140.SZ
600684.SH
600614.SH
000777.SZ
002701.SZ
002078.SZ
300126.SZ
000920.SZ
300133.SZ
300488.SZ
002356.SZ
600887.SH
600377.SH
601636.SH
000531.SZ
002149.SZ
600572.SH
601313.SH
600587.SH
601011.SH
603025.SH
000710.SZ
002502.SZ
000901.SZ
600804.SH
601717.SH
002223.SZ
600268.SH
600352.SH
600633.SH
600192.SH
002568.SZ
601567.SH
300455.SZ
600073.SH
000670.SZ
600068.SH
002658.SZ
300117.SZ
000937.SZ
600499.SH
002514.SZ
000582.SZ
600829.SH
600961.SH
600255.SH
600754.SH
603869.SH
300249.SZ
601336.SH
601328.SH
600971.SH
300297.SZ
601001.SH
300145.SZ
600053.SH
601088.SH
000983.SZ
002300.SZ
600105.SH
601111.SH
002450.SZ
000510.SZ
601608.SH
000402.SZ
600432.SH
600201.SH
600552.SH
600325.SH
600521.SH
000975.SZ
002603.SZ
300135.SZ
601579.SH
300275.SZ
300123.SZ
002117.SZ
600837.SH
002183.SZ
600217.SH
300470.SZ
000552.SZ
002371.SZ
600290.SH
000861.SZ
600425.SH
000978.SZ
600864.SH
600490.SH
002472.SZ
600602.SH
300172.SZ
000600.SZ
601169.SH
600668.SH
601788.SH
600311.SH
002628.SZ
600148.SH
600749.SH
600180.SH
000410.SZ
603315.SH
300400.SZ
600460.SH
601918.SH
002013.SZ
600468.SH
600223.SH
603989.SH
002480.SZ
300062.SZ
601233.SH
600997.SH
300096.SZ
300253.SZ
002065.SZ
600590.SH
601028.SH
600790.SH
300103.SZ
600196.SH
601588.SH
603018.SH
002494.SZ
600206.SH
002572.SZ
600482.SH
000088.SZ
300380.SZ
002166.SZ
002228.SZ
300227.SZ
002449.SZ
600527.SH
002037.SZ
603023.SH
300006.SZ
600687.SH
002773.SZ
600150.SH
600507.SH
603001.SH
300024.SZ
300039.SZ
002752.SZ
600501.SH
002233.SZ
300305.SZ
000895.SZ
600636.SH
601018.SH
002557.SZ
300261.SZ
600199.SH
002454.SZ
002124.SZ
002197.SZ
300160.SZ
002052.SZ
600975.SH
603085.SH
600489.SH
000876.SZ
600037.SH
300364.SZ
600688.SH
002389.SZ
002412.SZ
300215.SZ
601098.SH
601968.SH
300176.SZ
002400.SZ
600645.SH
300410.SZ
601929.SH
002247.SZ
002627.SZ
601208.SH
000738.SZ
600588.SH
600897.SH
000519.SZ
300057.SZ
300404.SZ
002571.SZ
600959.SH
600987.SH
300334.SZ
601799.SH
603369.SH
603598.SH
600309.SH
002304.SZ
000545.SZ
002724.SZ
600865.SH
000938.SZ
002355.SZ
600015.SH
600064.SH
300246.SZ
603718.SH
600100.SH
300195.SZ
601886.SH
300464.SZ
603099.SH
600420.SH
002769.SZ
002239.SZ
300418.SZ
600719.SH
002271.SZ
002548.SZ
002424.SZ
300228.SZ
300009.SZ
300150.SZ
000428.SZ
300118.SZ
000701.SZ
002512.SZ
000651.SZ
601998.SH
000061.SZ
002109.SZ
000001.SZ
300212.SZ
300203.SZ
002616.SZ
002527.SZ
002267.SZ
000858.SZ
600820.SH
000024.SZ
002316.SZ
300069.SZ
603116.SH
600439.SH
600543.SH
002102.SZ
600287.SH
000836.SZ
600386.SH
600801.SH
600023.SH
002040.SZ
002635.SZ
002597.SZ
300012.SZ
300435.SZ
002608.SZ
603288.SH
600773.SH
300205.SZ
600098.SH
002732.SZ
300408.SZ
600502.SH
300188.SZ
000089.SZ
600666.SH
300164.SZ
300066.SZ
000554.SZ
600660.SH
002673.SZ
600740.SH
002342.SZ
600328.SH
300416.SZ
601012.SH
000521.SZ
002159.SZ
002326.SZ
000758.SZ
002553.SZ
002460.SZ
600528.SH
002678.SZ
300070.SZ
300458.SZ
000413.SZ
002031.SZ
300351.SZ
000883.SZ
002268.SZ
300357.SZ
300032.SZ
002465.SZ
002091.SZ
600395.SH
002693.SZ
300251.SZ
600106.SH
002263.SZ
300231.SZ
600117.SH
600010.SH
002390.SZ
002294.SZ
002209.SZ
600595.SH
601992.SH
600540.SH
600893.SH
002739.SZ
000667.SZ
001896.SZ
002056.SZ
600218.SH
002641.SZ
002707.SZ
300395.SZ
000538.SZ
603588.SH
002178.SZ
600173.SH
300190.SZ
002116.SZ
002156.SZ
002038.SZ
601872.SH
002044.SZ
002106.SZ
000860.SZ
600779.SH
000707.SZ
300020.SZ
600063.SH
600288.SH
002186.SZ
002235.SZ
002004.SZ
601933.SH
000619.SZ
002478.SZ
300267.SZ
002531.SZ
002386.SZ
600900.SH
600641.SH
600759.SH
600178.SH
000818.SZ
000629.SZ
300323.SZ
000540.SZ
002025.SZ
600730.SH
600856.SH
300288.SZ
603366.SH
000897.SZ
600061.SH
600613.SH
601311.SH
600988.SH
300341.SZ
002143.SZ
002668.SZ
603026.SH
601377.SH
600271.SH
300082.SZ
002094.SZ
002766.SZ
600845.SH
600155.SH
002214.SZ
000049.SZ
601008.SH
300306.SZ
601555.SH
601005.SH
002155.SZ
002716.SZ
002068.SZ
002376.SZ
002736.SZ
600676.SH
300254.SZ
000815.SZ
601226.SH
002547.SZ
300287.SZ
601699.SH
002657.SZ
600693.SH
002428.SZ
300476.SZ
600708.SH
603618.SH
600723.SH
000697.SZ
300315.SZ
601901.SH
002776.SZ
600188.SH
000989.SZ
002128.SZ
600408.SH
002364.SZ
000852.SZ
600297.SH
600350.SH
000969.SZ
002177.SZ
300310.SZ
600138.SH
600305.SH
600888.SH
002236.SZ
002651.SZ
600860.SH
000426.SZ
000919.SZ
000801.SZ
600369.SH
000596.SZ
002283.SZ
002062.SZ
300425.SZ
002331.SZ
000780.SZ
603939.SH
601777.SH
000525.SZ
600531.SH
002441.SZ
601168.SH
000821.SZ
600187.SH
002110.SZ
000559.SZ
600810.SH
002604.SZ
300090.SZ
002503.SZ
300444.SZ
300393.SZ
002349.SZ
601222.SH
002702.SZ
000926.SZ
002070.SZ
603969.SH
601107.SH
600137.SH
300457.SZ
601928.SH
600371.SH
603111.SH
600057.SH
002225.SZ
600261.SH
600426.SH
002382.SZ
300335.SZ
600486.SH
600333.SH
000735.SZ
300485.SZ
600259.SH
300409.SZ
600169.SH
603678.SH
600200.SH
300144.SZ
300419.SZ
002394.SZ
603088.SH
002310.SZ
300142.SZ
000031.SZ
002713.SZ
000887.SZ
002202.SZ
600009.SH
002152.SZ
600118.SH
600416.SH
603998.SH
002620.SZ
600535.SH
002550.SZ
000680.SZ
300479.SZ
002770.SZ
600429.SH
000751.SZ
002352.SZ
300100.SZ
300119.SZ
002594.SZ
002370.SZ
000719.SZ
600312.SH
300225.SZ
000608.SZ
300043.SZ
601616.SH
600006.SH
002296.SZ
002690.SZ
002084.SZ
603993.SH
601058.SH
002210.SZ
300120.SZ
002583.SZ
600177.SH
600619.SH
300187.SZ
000813.SZ
002445.SZ
300278.SZ
600467.SH
300333.SZ
300473.SZ
600508.SH
000616.SZ
300329.SZ
603108.SH
300371.SZ
002586.SZ
600459.SH
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Figure 2: Network visualization of a too-connected stock. The size of a node is proportional to
its out-degree. The subgraph contains all the edges starting from the node ‘601318.SH’. The ego-network
illustrate how the too-connected stocks take control over the whole system.
tribution to systemic turnover. Recall the mechanism beyond link formation of stocks, the
peculiar topology results from a specific overlap pattern among mutual funds’ holdings,
and provides possible paths through which the market panic spreads from one stock to its
successors.
3.2. The herding behavior of mutual funds
To fully understand where disassortativeness of the stock network origins from, we inves-
tigate mutual fund institutions’ stocks holding status in this section. Traders’ investment
strategy may be driven by both minimizing risk for themselves and group psychology (Werm-
ers, 1999; Sias, 2004). One of the group psychology in investment decision, namely ‘herding’,
refers to that if investors have a comparative advantage in holding securities with certain
characteristics, however, as a security acquires these characteristics market participants in
aggregate will purchase it (Falkenstein, 1996). The net result is that they tend to herd to-
gether, following similar investment strategy, especially when inexperienced investors dom-
inate the market. And this could interact with stock prices (Dasgupta et al., 2011; Edelen
et al., 2016). Yet, less attention has been paid to the possible effects on the stability of the
entire market system.
Fig. 3 illustrates the mutual fund institutions’ investment distribution in June 2015.
Here, stocks are divided into five groups according to the out-degree sequence quantile, as
the out-degree reflects the importance of a node in case of disturbances (Chan-Lau, 2010)
and it is highly heterogeneous in the presented network. After excluding nodes with zero out-
degree, the 30th quantile, 60th quantile, 90th quantile of out-degree sequence are denoted
as D0.3, D0.6, D0.9, respectively. d stands for out-degree. The mutual fund institutions
are labeled from 1 to 87 vertically in Fig. 3. Every institution has one horizontal color
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Figure 3: Mutual fund institutions’ investment patterns. The mutual fund institutions are labeled
from 1 to 87 vertically. After excluding nodes with zero out-degrees, the 30th quantile, 60th quantile,
90th quantile of out-degree sequence are 451, 946, 1490, and denoted as D0.3, D0.6, D0.9, respectively. d
stands for the out-degree of stocks. Every institution has one horizontal color bar showing its preference
of investments. (a) Each grid presents the number of stocks one institution hold divided by the number of
stocks in the corresponding out-degree category. (b) Each grid presents the average market value per stock
one institution hold in the corresponding out-degree category.
bar showing its preference of investments. In Fig. 3(a), each grid presents the number of
stocks one institution hold divided by the number of stocks in the corresponding out-degree
category. As can be seen in the Fig. 3(a), horizontally, the greater the out-degree, the
darker the grid, suggesting that most mutual fund institutions invest on the same stocks
of highly connected. Relevant one-tailed, paired-samples t tests testify that the preference
increment with out-degrees is significant (see the middle column of Table 3). And this
investment pattern exists in the stock market of China consistently without being confined
by the market status (see Appendix Fig. A6). Note that most institutions on the whole have
invested a lot of stocks to diversify their investment portfolios. In particular, institutions
labeled from 1 to 25 in Fig. 3(a) invested at least 700 out of 2709 stocks. For example,
China Southern Fund Management Co., Ltd alone invested 1821 stocks, ranking first in the
number of stocks investing among 87 mutual fund institutions.
From a different perspective, in Fig. 3(b), each grid presents the average market value
per stock one institution hold in the corresponding out-degree category, which depicts how
much each mutual fund institution invests in a certain kind of stocks on average. Similarly
to Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b) shows that mutual fund institutions invest much more money per
stock on stocks with larger out-degrees (relevant one-tailed, paired-samples t tests are also
significant, see the right column of Table 3), especially institutions at the bottom. Those
institutions are presented in Appendix Table A5, which are those invest the most money
per stock in the ‘D0.9 < d’ group, investing large amounts of money on stocks with high
out-degrees while simultaneously investing many other stocks with low out-degrees.
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Both Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) show similar gradient color from low out-degree category to
high out-degree category, implying that most mutual fund institutions have the preference
on stocks with large out-degrees. Moreover, even though each mutual fund institution
follows a diversified portfolio strategy whereas they have investment over all groups of stocks,
surprisingly there is little diversity in mutual fund institutions’ preferences as a whole. We
argue that the overall similar investment pattern is a kind of herding, which origins in the
mimicking investment holdings strategy. In circumstances of immature stock market in
China, the institutional herding behavior influences the stock market not only through the
coupling structure between institutions and stocks but also the impact of mutual funds’
holding on investing choices of inexperienced investors. Though we investigate only the
temporarily static snapshot of stocks holding, the results exhibit the outcomes of the trading
by institutions that have been considered in previous studies (Sias, 2004), thus depict a
meaningful aspect of herding behavior.
Table 3: One-tailed, paired-samples t tests for Fig. 3.
Hypothesis (grid value)
T-test Statistic
for Fig. 3(a)
(p-value)
T-test Statistic
for Fig. 3(b)
(p-value)
H0:‘d = 0’ no less than ‘0 < d ≤ D0.3’
H1:‘d = 0’ less than ‘0 < d ≤ D0.3’
-14.48
(0.000*)
-5.44
(0.000*)
H0:‘0 < d ≤ D0.3’ no less than ‘D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6’
H1: ‘0 < d ≤ D0.3’ less than ‘D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6’
-9.64
(0.000*)
-1.28
( -0.101)
H0: ‘D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6’ no less than ‘D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9’
H1: ‘D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6’ less than ‘D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9’
-8.09
(0.000*)
-3.89
(0.000*)
H0: ‘D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9’ no less than ‘D0.9 < d’
H1: ‘D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9’ less than ‘D0.9 < d’
-13.12
(0.000*)
-3.742
(0.000*)
Note: After excluding nodes with zero out-degrees, the 30th quantile, 60th quantile, 90th quantile of out-degree sequence are
denoted as D0.3, D0.6, D0.9, respectively. d stands for out-degree. The one-tailed, paired-samples t tests show the significance
that the higher the out-degree, the greater the grid value is. One exception is that the ‘0 < d ≤ D0.3’ group is not significantly
greater than the ‘d = 0’ group under the p − value < 0.05 significance level, mainly because of the smoothing that value
averaging can produce, where the ‘0 < d ≤ D0.3’ group has 117 stocks and ‘d = 0’ group has 2319 stocks.
In particular, mutual fund institutions massively hold stocks of high out-degrees while
also invest low out-degree stocks simultaneously, making it easier for some stocks to be con-
nected to other stocks and then become ‘too-connected’ nodes. Furthermore, the investment
size on those ‘too-connected’ stocks are large, meaning their impact on successor stocks can
be fatal and hard to be ignored. Thus, those stocks, though not competent in market value,
become highly connected and even too-connected-to-fail, raising the concern of domino effect
in market crash.
3.3. Too-connected stocks are more stable in the crash
The June 26 2015 experienced two thirds of stocks in A-shares market reaching their
down limits, and is the second biggest crash in China stock market history as the SSEC
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index tumbled 345 points for its biggest one-day drop since February 2007. It is a proper
sample for understanding the crash.
Like what we do in Fig. 3, we classify stocks into five groups according to their out-
degrees. Fig. 4 shows average percentage changes of the five groups of stocks on June 26
2015. To make the figure explicit to read, here we use non-overlapping time windows of ten
minutes instead of one minute as described in data section, while this would neither influence
computation results on these specific time stamps nor the overall trending shown in Fig. 4.
We find that the greater the out-degree, the less the stock may drop when crash happens,
suggesting that too-connected stocks will be relatively stable in the crash, especially stocks in
the category of highest out-degrees (pink line) always have smaller absolute declines during
the day.
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Figure 4: Average percentage changes of five groups of stocks in every ten minutes on June 26,
2015. Two exceptions are: 1) all groups of stocks share similar average percentage change level at the last
30 minutes of transaction hours because 2027 out of 2423 active stocks reached their lower limits when the
market closed; 2) the average percentage changes of the second smallest out-degree group is lower than zero
out-degree group because the latter group possesses more than 2300 stocks where the big falls and small
falls are averaged. Apart from all these, Fig. 4 generally demonstrates the greater the out-degree, the less
the stock may drop when crash happens, suggesting that too-connected stocks will be relatively stable in
the crash.
The correlation of price trend between highly connected stocks and their successors in the
network is of spurt of interest. To achieve this, we investigate the percentage changes of top
five stocks of largest out-degrees and their successors in Fig. 5 on June 26 2015, respectively.
Each dot represents the percentage change of one too-connected stock on x-axis and the
average percentage change of its successors on y-axis, all in non-overlapping time windows
of ten minutes. Dots in different colors tell which too-connected stock they belong to. We
find that the dots are arranged in a quadratic function shape, meaning that when the prices
of too-connected stocks fall a little, their successors’ prices have dropped a lot. For example,
when the too-connected stocks percentage changes are -2%, their successors have 9% off in
prices.
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For the purpose of significance test, two different random experiments are performed
and demonstrated in Fig. 5. In experiment (1), all links in the established stock network
are randomly shuffled to reorganized the structure while keeping the density static and
as compared to the original network, top stocks and their successors will be completely
randomized. In experiment (2), only nodes of the established stock network are randomly
shuffled to ignore the sharing of investors while keeping the network structure static, and
as compared to the original network, the degree distribution will be the same, however, top
stocks and their successors will be randomized. In both experiments, we selected out the top
five stocks of largest out-degrees and calculated their percentage changes as well as average
percentage changes of their successors, making it comparable with dots originated from the
real network. The two random experiments are separately repeated 100 times and mean
results of them are shown in square and triangle makers in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 exhibits that, either in random experiment (1) or (2), the percentage changes of the
‘too-connected’ stocks are nearly the same with their successors’. This implies that under
either a complete alternative network structure or reorganizations of nodes only, which could
reflect distinct landscapes of investment strategies, the highly connected nodes’ percentage
changes behave obviously different with our empirical outcomes. Thus the empirical results
significantly demonstrate that the most connected nodes fell less than their successors in
most transaction hours. In other words, when the too-connected stocks dropped a little, their
successors declined more than that, suggesting that the turbulence of the market might be
amplified by the too-connected stocks and this phenomena is pervasive and can be well
replicated in other three crisis days (see Appendix Fig. A9,A10).
3.4. Too-connected stocks boost the market risk
Whether the too-connected stocks are useful in forecasting their successors is remained
to be discussed. To answer this, time series data of stocks’ percentage changes in every
one minute are utilized to testify the influence mechanism through Granger Causality test.
Granger Causality test tells the prediction ability of a time series X on another time series
Y . X is Granger-cause Y if Y could be better predicted by the historical values of both X
and Y than only by historical values of Y (Granger, 1969). We follow the procedure of (Toda
and Yamamoto, 1995) for Granger Causality testing because of its advantage of avoiding a
pretest bias. It could be carried out through building prediction models and Wald-tests. For
each one of the too-connected stocks, denote its intraday-one-minute percentage changes as
X and one of its successors’ as Y . The null hypothesis here is that X is not Granger-cause Y .
We carry out Granger Causality tests on all pairs of stocks in a given day. The significance
level p of tests is set to 0.05. If p < 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected.
As the data of mutual fund holdings are snapshots on June 30 2015 and we assume (see
discussions in the section of data and Table 2) the holdings would not change too much
within a few days, we narrow down the sampling period to four days that around June 30
and all experienced market crash as large amount of stocks reached their down limits. In
Fig. 6, the x-axis is the date and the y-axis is the ratio of pairs of stocks that successfully
reject the null hypothesis. According to the descending order of weights, edges in our stock
network are divided into four groups. w is the edge weight. The 40th quantile, 70th quantile,
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Figure 5: Correlations between ‘too-connected’ stocks’ percentage changes and their succes-
sors’. The average percentage changes of a stock in every ten minutes on June 26 2015 is used as its market
performance, while each highly connected stock has a single percentage changes time series that consists of
24 points and corresponding successors are specified by an averaged percentage changes. Dots refer to stocks
with highest out-degrees in our network. They all have more than 1900 successors. In experiment (1), a
random network with 2709 nodes and 313,307 edges is built, whose degree distribution is more uniform than
our network. In experiment (2), 2709 nodes of our network are randomly shuffled. In both experiments,
we selected out the top five stocks of largest out-degrees in each randomized network and calculated its
percentage changes as well as average percentage changes of their successors, making it comparable with
dots result originated from the real network. The two random experiments are separately repeated 100
times.
90th quantile of weight sequences are denoted as W0.4, W0.7, W0.9. Accordingly, the y-axis
indicator is the proportion of edges that its source significantly Granger-cause its target.
Moreover, we calculate the proportions of any pair of stocks that has a Granger Causality
relationship with respect to their intraday-one-minute percentage changes for each day. The
proportions are shown by cross signs. As shown in Fig. 6, during extreme market crisis, for
each pair of stocks linked in the present network, the more influential (higher edge weights)
the source node, the higher probability of it being a Granger Cause for its target node.
26-Jun-15 29-Jun-15 02-Jul-15 03-Jul-15
Date
0.60
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0.75
0.80
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Figure 6: Granger Causality tests for directed links. According to the descending order of weights,
edges in the stock network are divided into 4 groups. w is the edge weight. The 40th quantile, 70th quantile,
90th quantile of weight sequence are denoted as W0.4, W0.7, W0.9, respectively. The y-axis indicator is the
proportion of edges that its source is significant a Granger-cause of its target (the pairs of stocks that fail
to provide test results due to the data quality have been excluded from denominators of the ratios). The
average level is refer to the proportion of any pair of stocks that has Granger Causality relationship.
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In addition, Table 4 shows that percentage changes of five stocks with highest out-degrees
have higher-level of ability to predict the future percentage changes of theirs successors than
the average level. This is the case over the four days of market crash. The results imply
that, on one hand, both the edge weight and out-degree defined in our network successfully
capture the actual economic meaning about the ability of stock price leading. On the other
hand, the mutual funds mimicking holding strategies have made certain nodes so ‘big’ in con-
nectivity that they are extremely influential to the others, that is, the too-connected stocks’
prices falling provide statistically significant information about their successors’ future prices
falling. It is worth noting that, though the too-connected stocks are highly connected to
each other, usually considered as ‘rich-club’ effect, they do not have such prediction power
for each other (see Appendix Fig. A5).
Table 4: Granger Causality tests results for edges from nodes with highest out-degrees.
Node 26.Jun 29.Jun 2.Jul 3.Jul
average level 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.63
601318.SH 0.72 0.73 0.95 0.67
601166.SH 0.79 0.77 0.94 0.62
600036.SH 0.81 0.65 0.88 0.70
600016.SH 0.90 0.78 0.96 0.67
600030.SH 0.81 0.84 0.96 0.71
Note: The average level refers to the proportion of any pair of stocks in the network that has a Granger Causality relationship.
The other decimals are the proportions of successors with five most connected stocks being their Granger-causes.
Note that, the top five stocks with highest out-degrees as a whole take only 3.6 percent of
capitalization of A-shares market in June 2015, which is not a big part, while out-strength
of the five nodes in total owns 11.8 percent of the sum of weights of all edges. Thus, it
is their connectivity that makes them influential. Recall that the relationship shown in
Fig. 5, one conclusion can be drawn that a small downward fluctuation of too-connected
stocks will cause their successors drop more in stock market crisis. This reminds us that the
overall similar investment ownership strategy results in not a matter of ‘too-big-to-fail’ but
‘too-connected-to-fail’. While these too-connected stocks behave relatively strong during
the market turbulence, the ‘small’ stocks connected to them suffer from sharp fall.
Figs. 5, 6, and Table 4 also provide evidence on the cascade of price falling from the
too-connected stocks to their successors. That is, once the prices of too-connected stocks
fall even slightly, the initial losses frighten the huge amount of uninformed investors, thus
trigger market panic and many of these investors find themselves needing to sell whatever
stocks they hold to runaway from the market. As a result, many other stocks’ prices move
down and start another round of losses. Accordingly, the too-connected stocks boost the
overall risk and lead to a sharp market fall through the spiral.
The spiral is different from that proposed by Brunnermeier et al.(Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009). Their spiral is primarily because of liquidity shortage that driven by
funding problems of speculators, while the present spiral is largely because of the network
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disassortativeness arising from herding and forced by the premature market full of extremely
inexperienced investors who easily affected not only by institutional trading activity but also
initial tiny shocks. Though the cascade is quite short (one hop), but it would spread the
market panic and amplify the drops of the successors, leading to an abrupt crash of the
market.
4. Discussion
Collective human behavior has led to several crisis in financial market (Preis et al.,
2013). Based on investors’ strategies and interactions with investment targets, this paper
explores the complex issue of too-connect-to-fail in deliberately simplified network design
of China stock market in times of market crash. The defined formation mechanism of
the stock network sheds light on the importance of market participants’ herding behavior in
investment. It is shown that mutual fund institutions seek for high diversity across individual
investment strategy, however, low diversity across the system as a whole (see Fig. 3) leads
to investment concentration in some stocks. Those stocks, which are mainly stocks of large-
cap and financial firms (see Appendix Table A2 and A3), become highly connected and the
network is therefore disassortative, which in turn has increased the systemic risk. Those
who diversified their portfolio a lot are likely to suffer great losses in times of market crash
(see Appendix Fig. A3) and the diversification strategy no longer works because of the high-
level of systemic risk. Hence, it is important to reexamine the trade-off between individual
investment decision and global efficiency (Schweitzer et al., 2009). The severe ‘herding’
among China stock market may be induced by complicated reasons. In particular, with
unwillingness to miss out on the bull market ride before the crash happens, investors simply
mimic the investment decisions of others (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). While few studies
have integrated herding behavior into the overall stock market risk, our results suggest that
the potential of combining extensive investor behavioral factors, especially those irrational
ones, could offer a better understanding of the stock market systemic risk, like the too-
connected-to-fail risk.
In the knowledge of herding creating too-connected stocks, this paper further stresses
sufficient attention should be paid to the possibly more severe issue of too-connected-to-
fail. The highly connected stocks are not comparatively ‘big’ enough in stock market value,
but has profound influence on other stocks through their connectedness. Our discussion
is different from the debate on too-big-to-fail in banking system (Sorkin, 2010; Battiston
et al., 2012), while in line with consideration of systemic risk (Chan-Lau, 2010; Leo´n et al.,
2011). Through Granger Causality tests, it is found that even if the too-connected stock is
not of complete failure, its bit of falling down is likely to cause market panic to propagate.
The panic in turn leads to other stocks’ turbulence due to the complex coupled-structure in
stock network, where systemic risk grows, and finally exacerbates the market crash. Granger
Causality is not necessarily true causality. Nevertheless, from a statistical perspective, the
results indicate the predictive power of falling from too-connected stocks, implying that
they would be better signals in warning the market at early stages. Given the cascade of
stock failures, our findings may neither provide enough support on crash prediction in stock
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market nor extending to the markets of other countries, but could offer possible mechanism,
such as the network structure and the risk contagion channels from stocks with large out-
degrees to stocks with small out-degrees, to simulate or rehearse the market crash, which
can be triggered by a disturbance of any too-connected stocks.
The herding behavior studied in this paper, admittedly, is not the exclusive pathway for
boosting the market crash, but an extremely important one, as it exerts the too-connected-
to-fail risk. The presented analysis raises far-reaching implications for the design of public
policy. The first and foremost might be that investment restrictions to avoid the emergence
of ‘too-connected-to-fail’ should be added, that is to reshape the stock network, making the
stock market more robust to shocks (Schweitzer et al., 2009; Roukny et al., 2013; Bardoscia
et al., 2017). Real ecosystems studies suggest that disassortative systems can be more
resistant to certain kinds of perturbation (May et al., 2008), while epidemiological works
indicate that disassortative networks are more convenient for infection to spread than the
assortative ones (Gupta et al., 1989). From the evidence of China stock market, regulators
should be wary of its disassortative characteristics in networking stocks, with the emergence
of too-connected stocks that potentially leading to system-wide spread of sharp fall. In
contrast, heterogeneities of investment strategy would turn out to shake off the problem
and become a source of stability. Thus, regulations of reshaping network topology, such as
systemic risk leverage constraints or transaction tax (Poledna and Thurner, 2016), incentive
measures of ‘minority rewards’ (Mann and Helbing, 2017), would be better solutions to
lessen the systemic risk.
Meanwhile, our results have suggested that the too-connected stocks lead and amplify
their successors’ price failing. This implies that the too-connected stocks as well as stocks on
the high-weighted linkages should be the focus of regulation for their capability of amplifying
risk. For example, drops of those too-connected stocks at early stages can indeed be warning
signals to the market. Intuitively, the too-connected stocks can be ideal targets in saving
the market, because their price-rising may inject faith into the market. However, our further
exploration demonstrates that unexpectedly, in the growing market, too-connected stocks
share the similar rise with their successors and have little predicting power of price increment
for their successors (see Appendix Figs. A7,A8, Table A4). This helps to explain why the
bailout measure, that the People’s Bank of China provided cash to brokers to buy stocks
of large-cap, state-owned stocks, mostly are nodes with high out-degrees in the network we
built, was not efficient enough to rescue the market from drowning in the 2015 market crash.
However, one alternative bailout choice could be reducing the fragility of stocks that
are systemically important, likewise limiting the trading activities of stocks that are highly
connected to stop them from falling further, to lessen the risk of investor panic cascading
to their successors. The ‘Circuit Breakers Mechanism’, a kind of trading curb introduced
by China securities surveillance department in the early 2016, however, was a whole market
temporary pause. It not only limited the whole market liquidity but also intensified mar-
ket panic. In contrast, the intentional modularity within the market (Haldane and May,
2011) may well prevent the cascading failure from spreading around the system. Overall,
stock market monitoring policy could obtain some insights from the present approach that
illustrates the possible origin for stock market instabilities and systemic risk.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new method of networking stocks based on common mutual
funds to investigate the market crash in 2015 in China. We find that the China mutual fund
institutions herding similar investment strategies on the whole makes some stocks become
too-connected. A small downward fluctuation of those stocks contributes to sharp decline of
other stocks through the interconnection between investor and equity during market crash,
inducing the issue of too-connected-to-fail. From the prospective of systemic risk, policies
to deal with the intensity of ‘too-connected’ can be drawn from such network model. Our
work could be of interest to both market practitioners and policy makers.
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Appendix A Tables and figures
Table A1: The fraction of features in each category grouped by out-degree to the features of
all the stocks.
Category total out-degree total out-strength total stock market value sample ratio
d = 0 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.86
0 < d ≤ D0.3 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.04
D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9 0.44 0.39 0.15 0.04
D0.9 < d 0.22 0.40 0.18 0.01
total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: After excluding nodes with zero out-degree, the 30 quantile, 60 quantile, 90 quantile
of out-degree sequence are denoted as D0.3, D0.6, D0.9, respectively. d stands for out-degree.
The last column shows a benchmark proportions of each stock category. Column 1 and 2
show that the most connected stocks are influential in both out-degree and out-strength.
The sum of out-strength of nodes with top out-degrees represents 40 % of the total edge
weights in network. In terms of market value, which is a real world characteristic of stock,
the group of ‘D0.9 < d’ owns only 0.18 proportion of market value to total 2709 stocks.
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Table A2: Numbers (proportions) of stocks by sector in different out-degree categories.
category d = 0 0 < d ≤ D0.3 D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6 D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9 D0.9 < d total
finance 6 1 10 16 16 49
(0.122) (0.02) (0.204) (0.327) (0.327) (1)
information technology 175 24 18 23 7 247
(0.709) (0.097) (0.073) (0.093) (0.028) (1)
transportation 71 1 2 2 3 79
(0.899) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (1)
manufacturing 1432 70 61 44 8 1615
(0.887) (0.043) (0.038) (0.027) (0.005) (1)
communication and culture 36 2 3 8 1 50
(0.72) (0.04) (0.06) (0.16) (0.02) (1)
agriculture 39 2 3 1 0 45
(0.867) (0.044) (0.067) (0.022) (0) (1)
construction 51 4 2 3 0 60
(0.85) (0.067) (0.033) (0.05) (0) (1)
real estate 117 2 0 2 2 123
(0.951) (0.016) (0) (0.016) (0.016) (1)
retailing 119 6 4 6 0 135
(0.881) (0.044) (0.03) (0.044) (0) (1)
electricity, gas, water 77 2 4 1 0 84
(0.917) (0.024) (0.048) (0.012) (0) (1)
service industry 88 1 6 7 2 104
(0.846) (0.01) (0.058) (0.067) (0.019) (1)
extractive industry 65 1 3 1 0 70
(0.929) (0.014) (0.043) (0.014) (0) (1)
other 42 1 1 2 0 46
(0.913) (0.022) (0.022) (0.043) (0) (1)
Sample size 2318 117 117 116 39 2707
(0.856) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.014) (0.999)
Note: The values in brackets are proportions of stocks in different categories. The ratios in
the last row called ‘sample size’ can be viewed as benchmark. There are two stocks without
industry label and are excluded in this table. The group of nodes with high out-degrees is
dominated by stocks from financial sector (see column 5 in finance row).
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Table A3: Proportions of stocks by equity style in different out-degree categories.
category d = 0 0 < d ≤ D0.3 D0.3 < d ≤ D0.6 D0.6 < d ≤ D0.9 D0.9 < d sample ratio
large-cap-value 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.31 0.08
large-cap-balance 0.09 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.41 0.12
large-cap-growth 0.05 0.22 0.30 0.47 0.28 0.09
mid-cap-value 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08
mid-cap-balance 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.14
mid-cap-growth 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.09
small-cap-value 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
small-cap-balance 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21
small-cap-growth 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10
total 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: The last column is the benchmark proportions by equity style. The most connected
nodes (D0.9 < d column) are mainly large-cap stocks. Most nodes with zero out-degree are
small-cap stocks (d = 0 column).
Table A4: Granger Causality test results for network in December 2014.
Granger Causality test for top five nodes with highest out-degrees and their successors
node proportion of successors with the node being their Granger-causes
601318.SH 0.240
601166.SH 0.285
000002.SH 0.262
600036.SH 0.266
600000.SH 0.288
Granger Causality tests for directed links
edges groups proportion of edges that its source is a Granger-cause of its target
average level 0.146
0 < w ≤ W0.4 0.180
W0.4 < w ≤ W0.7 0.197
W0.7 < w ≤ W0.9 0.217
w ≤ W0.9 0.277
Note: The average level refers to the proportion of any pair of stocks in the Dec-2014
network that has a Granger Causality relationship. The proportions are much lower than
that presented in Fig. 6 and Table 4 in the main text, implying the weak predicting power
of the source nodes for their target nodes in the Dec-2014 network. Nevertheless, the groups
of edges with higher weights have higher proportions than lower weights groups, and the
most connected stocks as well as the stocks linked together have higher test-passing ratio
that the average level, indicating the edges defined in our networking approach successfully
capture the actual economic meaning about the ability of stock price leading. The details
on how and why the Dec-2014 network is built can be found in main text.
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Table A5: The five mutual fund institutions that invest the most per stock in the ‘D0.9 < d’
group.
Mutual fund
institution
The average
holding market
value per stock in
‘D0.9 < d’ group
(unit: 1000 CNY)
The number of
stocks held in
‘D0.9 < d’
group
Proportion of
stocks held in
‘D0.9 < d’
group to the
number of all
stocks in the group
The number
of stocks
held in total
China AMC 1157086 40 1.00 1208
Fullgoal Fund 938770 39 0.97 1269
Penghua Fund 864474 40 1.00 1104
E Fund 719693 40 1.00 910
SWS MU Fund 557249 36 0.90 892
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
degree
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
out degree
in degree
Figure A1: Degree cumulative distribution function. The out-degree strongly leans towards zero. In
fact, there are 2319 out of 2709 nodes with out-degree equal to zero, and nodes with out-degrees higher than
1500 are left sporadically. The in-degree uniformly distributes in the range of 0 to 400, reflecting that each
stock are roughly equally affected by other stocks. The average out-degrees is about 115.
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Figure A2: The correlation between the out-degree and in-degree. The bubble size in (a) and (b)
is respectively proportional to out-strength and in-strength of the node. Nodes with out-degree equal to 0
have zero out-strength and they are naturally ignored in the plot (a). (a) shows that a few stocks are large
in out-degree as well as out-strength. The out-strength is highly correlated to out-degrees as the bubble
size increases with the out-degree. (b) exhibits that in-degree is weakly correlated to in-strength, and nodes
with top in-degrees are not all top out-degrees nodes. Because the existence of a number of nodes with
out-degree equal to 0, there’s a ribbon on the left, showing that when a node has no out-degree, it may have
in-degrees.
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Figure A3: The portfolio entropy of 87 mutual fund institutions and their absolute loss on June
26, 2015. June 26 is the day with most stocks declining to their down limits. The information entropy of
investment portfolio for each mutual fund institution is εj = −
∑n
i=1
hji
sj
log
hji
sj
, where hji is the capitalization
of investor j holds for stock i, sj is the total market value of all stocks investor j holds. Accordingly greater
εj indicates higher diversity of j’s investment strategy. There are n stocks available in the market. hji = 0
when investor j has no investment in stock i. The absolute loss for investor j is lj = |
∑n
i=1 hjidi|, where di
is the net percentage change of stock i on Jun 26. The entropy-based portfolio evaluation suggests that the
individual goal of maximizing the portfolio diversification, which results in high heterogeneity of the entire
market, failed in times of market crash.
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Figure A4: Measures of network as functions of the parameter k. A parameter denoted as k is range
from 0 to 1. For each k, we delete edges that have weight less than the 100 ∗ kth-quantile of the weight
sequence in the non-filtering network, and then calculate structural characteristics of the updated network.
In (a), W (k) is the 100 ∗kth-quantile weight of the non-filtering network. W (0) is the largest edge weight of
the non-filtering network. WS(k) is the sum of the weights of all the edges in the updated network. WS(0)
is the sum of the weights of all the edges in the non-filtering network. To retain the informative edges
(edges with higher weight) as well as to keep the network connectivity (the size of largest weakly connected
component) with little change, the value k = 0.95 is the threshold used in the paper (red line of dashes),
that is, delete edges with weights lower than the 95th percentile of edge weights sequence. The established
network of the stock market possesses 2709 nodes and 313307 edges after necessary filtering.
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Figure A5: Rich-club effect. The x-axis denotes the number of top r nodes of high out-degrees. The
number of edges in the subgraph constituted by the top r nodes of high out-degrees is denoted as e. r(r−1)
measures the maximum number of edges that r nodes could have in a directed graph. The number of edges
in the subgraph constituted by top r nodes of high out-degrees that passes the granger test is denoted as e¯
and accordingly e¯/r(r − 1) is the extent of interactive influence among the top r nodes of high out-degrees.
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Figure A6: Mutual fund institutions’ investment patterns in December 2014. The details on how
and why the Dec-2014 network is built can be found in main text. The mutual fund institutions are labeled
from 1 to 87 vertically. Every institution has one horizontal color bar showing its preference of investments.
(a) Each grid presents the number of stocks one institution hold divided by the number of stocks in the
corresponding out-degree category. (b) Each grid presents the average market value per stock one institution
hold in the corresponding out-degree category. After excluding nodes with zero out-degree, the 30 quantile,
60 quantile, 90 quantile of out-degree sequence are denoted as D0.3, D0.6, D0.9, respectively. d stands for the
out-degree of nodes. The figures show similar gradient color from low out-degree category to high out-degree
category, implying that most mutual fund institutions have the preference on stocks with large out-degrees.
The relevant one-tailed, paired-samples t tests confirm the significance of this kind of preference. The overall
pattern is much similar with Fig. 3 in the main text, indicating the herding in investment we revealed is
consistent and independent to the market performance.
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Figure A7: Average percentage changes of five groups’ stocks on December 25, 2014. The details
on how and why the Dec-2014 network is built can be found in main text. Intraday percentage changes
are computed from data that downloaded from Thomson Reuters’ Tick History. The five groups of stocks
experienced similar positive percentage changes when the market jump.
26
-2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0%
% change of too-connected stock
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
a
v
e
ra
g
e
 %
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
o
rs
601318.SH
000002.SZ
600000.SH
601166.SH
600036.SH
Figure A8: Correlations between ‘too-connected’ stocks’ percentage changes and their succes-
sors’ in December 2014. The details on how and why the Dec-2014 network is built can be found in
main text. The average percentage change of a stock in every ten minutes on December 25, 2014 is used as
its market performance, while each highly connected stock has a single percentage changes time series that
consists of 24 points and corresponding successors are specified by an averaged percentage change. Round
circles refer to stocks with highest out-degrees in our network. They all have more than 1900 successors.
Three of them are among the top five nodes with highest out-degrees in network of June 2015.
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Figure A9: Percentage changes of five groups of stocks on June 29, July 2, and July 3 in 2015.
These three days all experienced sharp market fall. The figures are consistent with Fig. 4 in the main text.
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Figure A10: Correlations between ‘too-connected’ stocks’ percentage changes and their succes-
sors’ on June 29, July 2, and July 3 in 2015. These three days all experienced sharp market falls.
The figures are consistent with Fig. 5 in the main text.
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